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ABSTRACT
Proposals for allocating scarce lifesaving resources in the face of the Covid-
19 pandemic have aligned in someways and conflicted in others. This paper
attempts a kind of priority setting in addressing these conflicts. In the first
part, we identify points on which we do not believe that reasonable people
should differ—even if they do. These are (i) the inadequacy of traditional
clinical ethics to address priority-setting in a pandemic; (ii) the relevance
of saving lives; (iii) the flaws of first-come, first-served allocation; (iv) the
relevance of post-episode survival; (v) the difference between age and other
factors that affect life-expectancy; and (vi) the need to avoid quality-of-
life judgments. In the second part, we lay out some positions on which
reasonable people can and do differ. These include (i) conflicts between
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maximizing benefits and priority to the worst off; (ii) role-based priority;
and (iii) whether patients’ existing lifesaving resources should be subject to
redistribution.
KEYWORDS: Covid-19, disability, ethics, priority-setting, triage,
ventilators
Much has been written of late about the ethical issues that would arise if a hospital
confronted a shortage of ventilators that prevented it from giving one to every patient
who could benefit and might otherwise die. While we do not know how likely this
prospect is, we know that the standards by which hospitals make those decisions will
be closely scrutinized.Worst of all would be leaving them to the unguided judgment of
exhausted, demoralized health care professionals.1 Decisions about how to prioritize
should be made well before the number of ventilators is surpassed by the number of
patients immediately needing them. Our society failed to adequately prepare for the
pandemic itself; we can at least prepare for the shortage of lifesaving resources that
failure will likely produce.
These decisions go far beyond ventilator shortages, though here we mostly use
ventilator-related examples to engage with current debates. The pandemic has already
required priority-setting decisions about scarce bed space, protective equipment, and
healthworker time,2 and about access to scarce drugs.3 If an antiviral proves effective or
a vaccine is developed, these ethical issues will again become highly salient. Different
interventions present different issues: because vaccines are provided at a single visit,
we will never be faced with the option of removing a scarce vaccine from one person to
save two. But the core challenge of fairly allocating scarce medical resources will repeat
itself in different ways throughout the Covid-19 pandemic.
There has been no shortage of proposals on how to allocate urgently needed scarce
lifesaving resources in recentmonths. These triage proposals have aligned in someways
and conflicted in others. This paper attempts a kind of priority setting in addressing
these conflicts. In thefirst part of thepaper,we layout someminimal positions onwhich
we do not believe that reasonable people should differ—even if they do. These are:
1) The inadequacy of traditional clinical ethics to address priority-setting in a
pandemic
2) The relevance of saving lives
3) The flaws of first-come, first-served allocation
4) The relevance of post-episode survival
5) The difference between age and other factors that affect life expectancy
6) The need to avoid quality-of-life judgments
1 E.J. Emanuel et al.,Fair Allocation of ScarceMedical Resources in theTime of Covid-19, NewEng. J.Med. (2020).
2 Joanne Lipmanfor, Cancer Surgeries and Organ Transplants are Being Put Off for Coronavirus. Can
They Wait?, ProPublica, https://www.propublica.org/article/cancer-surgeries-and-open-transplants-are-
being-put-off-for-coronavirus-can-they-wait (accessed Apr. 6, 2020).
3 Christopher Rowland & Joanna Slater, Spikes in Demand from Coronavirus Patients are Creating Shortages of
Asthma Drugs and Sedatives for Ventilator Patients, Wash. Post, https://www.washingtonpost.com/busine
ss/2020/04/12/drug-ventilator-shortage-coronavirus (accessed Apr. 12, 2020).
D
ow
nloaded from
 https://academ
ic.oup.com
/jlb/article/7/1/lsaa044/5862544 by guest on 02 Septem
ber 2020
Setting priorities fairly in response to Covid-19 • 3
Together thesepoints of reasonable agreement establish abroadconsensusonwhich
triage protocols can be based. In the second part, we lay out some positions on which
reasonable people can and do differ. We thereby aim to focus the ethical debate on the
issues we believe are the most difficult and morally important.
Our discussion of reasonable agreement is rooted in recognition of long-standing
and ongoing unfairness within health care and public health provision in the USA.
We focus on the impact of this unfairness on people with disabilities. As the US
Congress found in passing the Americans with Disabilities Act, ‘discrimination against
individuals with disabilities persists in such critical areas as . . . health services.’4 That
discrimination has taken the form not only of the outright denial of services, but of
the substantial undervaluation of the quality of lives of people with disabilities and of
the benefits they can receive from medical interventions. Other disadvantaged social
groups, notably African Americans and Native Americans, have also suffered a long
history of neglect and abuse from the health professions that has contributed to severe
and persisting health disparities. As a result of deeply entrenched discrimination and
injustice, peoplewithdisabilities and themembersof otherdisadvantaged social groups
have beenmore likely than the general population to contract Covid-19, and less likely
to receive a prompt, appropriate medical response.
REASONABLE AGREEMENT
The inadequacy of clinical ethics
Thefirst point onwhichwe think reasonable people should agree is that traditional clin-
ical ethics will not answer questions about how to allocate scarce life-saving resources,
such as ventilators. Orthodox clinical ethics directs each physician to act in the best
interests or at thedirectionof thepatient she is treating.5 Butmost physicians, especially
in a busy ER or ICU, treat multiple patients at any given time. If a physician has
more patients in need of ventilators than she has ventilators, she will have to violate
her duty to at least one. Further, in a pandemic where the number of patients who
need life-saving interventions exceeds the availability of those interventions, it is unfair
and counter-productive for individual clinicians to attempt to prioritize their current
patients over other patients.
The relevance of saving lives
The second point is that saving the greater number of lives when all cannot be saved—
reflected in giving priority to patients who are most likely to benefit from ventilation
or require less time on a ventilator—is a matter of overlapping consensus across many
ethical theories.6 It is hardly, as some critics suggest, a position limited to hard-core
utilitarians. Even Elizabeth Anscombe, a resolutely non-utilitarian philosopher who
4 Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (1990).
5 J.F. Childress & T.L. Beauchamp, Principles of Biomedical Ethics (Oxford University Press, 2001).
6 Derek Parfit, Innumerate Ethics, 7 Phil. & Pub. Aff. 285, 285–301 (1978); Nien-hê Hsieh et al.,The Numbers
Problem, 34 Phil. & Pub. Aff. 352, 352–372 (2006); Frances Myrna Kamm, Equal Treatment and Equal
Chances, 14 Phil. & Pub. Aff. 177, 177–194 (1985); Thomas Scanlon,WhatWeOwe to EachOther
(1998); see also Ryan T. Anderson et al., Moral Guidance on Prioritizing Care During a Pandemic, The Pub.
Discourse, https://www.thepublicdiscourse.com/2020/04/62001/ (accessed Apr. 5, 2020) (consensus
statement of various religious thinkers, endorsing the value of saving the most lives).
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questioned whether we had a duty to save the most lives, insisted, ‘I do not mean
to suggest that ‘because there are more’ isn’t a good reason for helping these and
not that one . . . ’7 The broader public health response to Covid-19 in the USA and
elsewhere steadfastly supports saving more lives. For example, it countenances delays
to lifesaving medical procedures like chemotherapy and organ transplantation. These
measures will inevitably cost some lives, while saving a greater number of others. In this
respect, priority-setting for ventilators or ICU beds is no different. For this reason, it is
misleading to claim that lives-maximizing triage policies sacrifice fairness to ‘efficient
optimization.’8 Efficiency in this context does not mean abstract gains in welfare or
economic productivity, but fewer people dying—not the only value that matters, but
certainly a bedrock one that is shared across ethical theories.9
The flaws of first-come, first-served
The third point is that a policy of ‘first-come, first-served’ would be more harmful and
less fair to people with disabilities—and members of other disadvantaged groups—
overall than a policy of saving the greater number of lives. In opposition to triage poli-
cies, Ari Ne’eman writes: ‘Though some insist otherwise, we should maintain a broad
approachof ‘first comefirst served’when it comes to lifesaving care, even scarcemedical
resources like ventilators. . . . those who can be helped should not be given lower
priority because of pre-existing disabilities, even those that will require more scarce
resources.’10 This proposal makes incorrect assumptions about how lives-maximizing
triage decisions will be made and how they will impact people with disabilities.
Advocates are right to challenge state policies that rely on inaccurate generalizations
about the length or quality of life of people with disabilities.11 But the most widely
accepted guidelines, like the Pittsburgh protocol, require individualized assessment
of patients rather than categorical exclusion.12 Individualized assessment means that
a patient with cystic fibrosis but above-average respiratory function would not be
excluded; she would be assigned priority on the basis of her assessed respiratory
function, not her pre-existing disability. These protocols also avoid close judgments
about the expected length of ventilation. Rather, they propose re-allocation if a patient
7 G.E.M. Anscombe,Who is Wronged?, 5 Oxford Rev. 16, 16–17 (1967).
8 Ari Ne’eman, I Will Not Apologize for My Needs, N.Y. Times, March 23, 2020, https://www.nytimes.
com/2020/03/23/opinion/coronavirus-ventilators-triage-disability.html.
9 Some writers have attempted to distinguish probability of survival from resource-intensity as triage criteria.
Although both would increase the number of lives saved, it has been argued that one is more acceptable than
the other. Interestingly, this argument has been made for each of these criteria against the other. See Joseph
Stramondo,Disability, Likelihood of Survival, and Inefficiency Amidst Pandemic, Bioethics.net, http://www.bi
oethics.net/2020/04/disability-likelihood-of-survival-and-inefficiency-amidst-pandemic (accessed Apr. 6,
2020, 12:10 PM); Deborah Hellman & Kate Nicholson, Rationing and Disability in a State of Crisis, Va. Pub.
L. & Legal Theory Research Paper No. 2020–33, https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_i
d=3570088 (accessed Apr. 16, 2020).
10Ne’eman, supra note 7.
11SeeMichelleM.Mello,GovindPersad,&Douglas B.White,RespectingDisability Rights—Toward ImprovedCrisis
Standards of Care, New Eng. J. Med., https://www.nejm.org/doi/full/10.1056/NEJMp2011997(accessed
May 19, 2020) (summarizing policies and challenges).
12Douglas White, A Model Hospital Policy for Allocating Scarce Critical Care Resources, U. Pitt. Dep’t
CriticalCareMed., https://ccm.pitt.edu/sites/default/files/UnivPittsburgh_ModelHospitalResourcePoli
cy_2020_04_15.pdf (accessed Apr. 3, 2020).
D
ow
nloaded from
 https://academ
ic.oup.com
/jlb/article/7/1/lsaa044/5862544 by guest on 02 Septem
ber 2020
Setting priorities fairly in response to Covid-19 • 5
is deteriorating despite ventilation, a guideline that converges with the medical-futility
criterion that even Ne’eman endorses.
Regarding impact, a first-come, first-served policy will likely be worse for people
with disabilities than protocols that aim to save more lives. This is both because fewer
lives overall will be saved and because disabled individuals are unlikely to make it to
the front of the queue.13 Under protocols that aim to save more lives, a subset of peo-
ple with specific disabilities—in particular pulmonary and cardiac disabilities—may
be assigned lower priority because of individualized assessments of their probability
of episode survival. Ne’eman argues that people with disabilities who support such
protocols fail to display the solidarity they owe to those whose disabilities limit their
prospects for survival.14 Individuals with and without disabilities, however, may feel,
and should be free to express, solidarity with different social groups: their families,
their coreligionists, or their local communities. Requiring solidarity with a specific
group denies agency to people with disabilities.15 Triage policies should not mandate
that people with disabilities reject protocols that would improve their, or their loved
ones’, access to potentially lifesaving treatments merely because they occupy—not by
choice—the same ascribed social category as someonewhose disability seriously limits
their prospect of benefit.
The relevance of life expectancy
The fourth point is that, at least sometimes, life expectancymatters for triage decisions.
When deciding whether a scarce ventilator should go to a patient with a late-stage,
metastatic cancerwith predicted survivalmeasured inmonths orweeks, the stark limits
on our ability to benefit this patient should matter. To accept this is not to say that
triage policies should always seek to maximize life-years; it is to deny another sort of
absolutism. Even the life-year skeptic should accept that life-expectancy can sometimes
matter. He must be prepared to say something about when and why.16 We turn to
reasonable disagreement about that question shortly.
The law, at least in the USA, does not proscribe savingmore lives or considering life
expectancy in the way we describe above. Providers may legally consider scientifically
supported evidence about which patients will benefit and how much when making
13 Joseph Millum & Govind Persad, Fair Coronavirus Triage Guidelines—Not Business as Usual—Will Save More
Patients with Disabilities, Denv. Post, https://www.denverpost.com/2020/04/07/guest-commentary-fai
r-coronavirus-triage-guidelines-not-business-as-usual-will-save-more-patients-with-disabilities (accessed
April 7, 2020).
14 Ari Ne’eman,When it Comes to Rationing, Disability Rights Law Prohibits More Than Prejudice, TheHastings
Ctr., https://www.thehastingscenter.org/when-it-comes-to-rationing-disability-rights-law-prohibits-
more-than-prejudice/ (accessed Apr. 10, 2020).
15 Govind Persad & David Wasserman, Diversity and Solidarity in Response to Covid-19, The Hastings
Ctr., https://www.thehastingscenter.org/diversity-and-solidarity-in-response-to-covid-19/ (accessed May
13, 2020).
16 Admittedly, this is an area whether it is particularly difficult to draw lines. In the face of this uncertainty and
disagreement, some may rely on the vague but familiar classification of ‘terminal illness,’ often quantified as 6
months or less. Terminal patients can be said to be dying already, in a stronger sense than all of us can be said to
be dying. Others may find this too vague, or insufficiently sensitive to enormous differences in life expectancy
beyond 6 months.
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treatment decisions, even if this disadvantages patients with certain disabilities.17 The
cases finding that providers have illegally discriminated involve groundless stereotyp-
ing, whereas decisions grounded in legitimate, even if disputable, medical evidence are
typically upheld.
The distinction between age and disability
Fifth, and relatedly, we should distinguish cases in which lower life expectancy is due
to age from those in which it is due to disease or disability. Age and life-expectancy,
of course, are closely correlated: the older a patient, all else equal, the shorter his life
expectancy. Butwe candistinguish two reasons for giving priority to younger over older
patients: that doing so will save more life-years, and that it will recognize the fact that
younger people have had fewer years of life. The first reason appeals to doing more
good,while the second is grounded in priority to theworst off, but both align in the case
of age. Allocating a scarce ventilator to a severely ill 20-year old rather than an equally ill
60-year old serves to reduce the inequality in life-span between them; it gives the scarce
resource to the patient who would be worse off without it.18
By contrast, when reduced life expectancy is due to an underlying disease or disabil-
ity, maximizing life expectancymay not align with priority to the worst off. The person
with lower life expectancymaybeworseoff thanothers, if their condition exposed them
to past disadvantage. It would be unfair to disadvantage them further by giving them
lower priority for a life-saving resource.19
Importantly, American constitutional law provides broad permission to consider
age.20 And statutes and regulations concerning age discrimination similarly permit the
consideration of age in many contexts: age discrimination law—unlike other areas of
civil rights law—‘specifies certain categories of agediscriminationwhichwill be consid-
ered permissible.’21 The Age Discrimination Act of 1975 and regulations interpreting
it permit the use of age as an effective proxy for another characteristic—like medical
benefit—that is legitimate to consider.22 And they exempt from review age-based
criteria that are authorized by federal, state, or local statutes or ordinances.23
The problems with quality-of-life judgments
The sixth and final point on which we think reasonable people should agree is that
triage policies should not attempt, for ethical, legal, and practical reasons, to pursue
17 See Leslie Wolf & Wendy Hensel, Valuing Lives: Allocating Scarce Medical Resources During a Public Health
Emergency and the Americans with Disabilities Act, 3 PLoS Currents (Sept. 21, 2011); Govind Persad,
Disability Law and the Case for Evidence-Based Triage in a Pandemic, 130 Yale L.J. F. 26 (2020).
18 Franklin G. Miller, Why I Support Age-Related Rationing of Ventilators for Covid-19 Patients, The Hastings
Ctr. (Apr. 9, 2020), https://www.thehastingscenter.org/why-i-support-age-related-rationing-of-ventila
tors-for-covid-19-patients; LarryR.Churchill,OnBeing anElder in aPandemic, TheHastingsCtr., https://
www.thehastingscenter.org/on-being-an-elder-in-a-pandemic (accessed Apr. 13, 2020).
19 Tyler M. John, Joseph Millum & David Wasserman,How to Allocate Scarce Health Resources Without Discrimi-
nating Against People with Disabilities, 33 Econ. & Phil. 161, 161–186 (2017).
20 Persad, supra note 22, at 896.
21 NAACP v. WilmingtonMed. Ctr., Inc., 491 F. Supp. 290, 316–17 (D. Del. 1980).
22 See Exceptions to the Rules against Age Discrimination, 45 C.F.R. § 90.14 (2007); see also Govind Persad,
Evaluating the Legality of Age-BasedCriteria inHealthCare: FromNondiscrimination andDiscretion toDistributive
Justice, 60 B.C.L. Rev. 889, 900 (2019).
23 42 U.S.C. § 6103(b)(2).
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the utilitarian goal of maximizing overall well-being. The view that maximizing well-
being is an appropriate goal of triage lies at the other extreme from the view that
decline to take numbers into account at all. It is also the view that has been most
vigorously critiqued by disability advocates. A triage policy that attempts to maximize
health—say by allocating scarce ventilators where they are predicted to produce the
greatest number of quality-adjusted life-years (QALYs)—would bemistaken on several
grounds. First, the general public frequently believe that a givendisability lowers quality
of life much more than people with that disability do.24 QALYs grounded in public
judgments would thus likely undervalue continued life with a pre-existing disability.
Second, even when disabilities genuinely lower quality of life, this frequently stems
from social arrangements that unjustly disadvantage people with disabilities.25 Third,
as noted above, if people with certain disabilities have experienced lower quality of
life in the past, there are reasons of fairness to give them higher priority for scarce
resources, even if thosemust be balanced against the value of using the resources to save
more lives or years of life. Finally, the practical and epistemic challenges of assessing a
patient’s pre-existing quality of life are immense in a pandemic.26 Allowing quality of
life assessments to be usedwould risk baking in prejudiced assumptions about the value
of the pre-Covid lives of people with disabilities.
AREASOFREASONABLEDISAGREEMENT
The areas of reasonable agreement we have identified encompass much of what is
found in existing triagedocuments in theUSA.Nevertheless, scholars andactivists have
highlighted other questions regarding the allocation of scarce resources that are both
important and the subject of reasonable disagreement. These are issues where ethical
inquiry couldmake particularly valuable contributions. In the following paragraphs, we
outline these issues and enumerate considerations on each side.
Conflicts betweenmaximizing benefits and priority to the worst off
Most theorists, including ourselves, think that decisions about the allocation of scarce
resources should take account of both the amount of benefits that a given allocationwill
provide and how those benefits are distributed among the beneficiaries. One helpful
wayof conceptualizing the concernwithdistribution is prioritarian—abenefit is valued
more highly the worse off the beneficiary. Above, we endorsed a presumption in favor
of saving more lives, and in favor of taking length of life into account in at least some
cases. A policy of saving more lives will often increase total benefits without worsening
the condition of the worst-off. A policy that takes account of extreme differences in
life expectancy could penalize some individuals who have already experienced very
poor health, but the vast difference in themagnitude of benefits provided by the scarce
resource would outweigh any negative impact on equality between patient groups.
24 Gary L. Albrecht & Patrick J. Devliege, The Disability Paradox: High Quality of Life Against the Odds, 48 Soc.
Science & Med. 977, 977–88 (1999); Sarah Goering, ‘You Say You’re Happy, but . . . ’: Contested Quality of
Life Judgments in Bioethics and Disability Studies, 5 J. Bioethical Inquiry 125, 125–135 (2008).
25 Govind Persad,Considering Quality of Life while Repudiating Disability Injustice: A Pathways Approach to Setting
Priorities, 47 J. L., Med. & Ethics 294, 294–303 (2019).
26 Emanuel, supra note 1.
D
ow
nloaded from
 https://academ
ic.oup.com
/jlb/article/7/1/lsaa044/5862544 by guest on 02 Septem
ber 2020
8 • Setting priorities fairly in response to Covid-19
Similarly, we endorsed giving priority based on younger age, which, all else equal, both
maximizes total benefits and favors the worst-off.
More challenging questions arise—for theory and practice—when maximizing
benefits and redressing disadvantage pull powerfully in different directions. Whether
triage policies should aim to maximize life-years saved is a case in point. Many, though
not all, disabilities reduce life expectancy. For example, persons with multiple sclerosis
are estimated to have life expectancies 7–14 years lower than the general population27
and persons with schizophrenia are estimated to lose 13–15 years on average.28 In
our current society, people with these disabilities typically also experience substantial
disadvantage, arising from—for instance—restricted opportunities, prejudice, and in
some cases pain and suffering. Take someone with Down syndrome, for example. She
is likely to have reduced life expectancy comparedwithmost other people her age, even
if all are expected to live long and full lives.29 She is also likely to have experienced
considerable disadvantage in her life already. If she and apersonof the same agewithout
Down syndrome present to an emergency roomwith acute respiratory distress, should
she be given lower priority? If the goal of a policy is onlymaximizing years of life saved,
she should. But once we take disadvantage into account the verdict is not so clear:
it depends on the relative weight given to maximizing benefits versus giving higher
priority to those who are worse off. This is a matter of debate.
Some would argue further that the person with Down syndrome should get higher
priority than similar patients who have not experienced disadvantage. A policy ofmaxi-
mizing lives savedwould likely savemore peoplewith disabilities,members ofminority
racial groups, and disadvantaged people than a first-come, first-served approachwould.
But even more members of these groups could be saved—with no net lives lost—
if policies explicitly prioritized saving them over others with comparable prognoses.
Whether and to what extent this would be ethically justified depends again on how we
should balance maximizing benefits against prioritizing the worst-off.
Prioritizing more disadvantaged patients in a triage protocol also faces practical
obstacles. For example, a protocol that assigned ‘points’ on the basis of race would
almost certainly be untenable underAmerican law,30 andone that assigned themon the
basis of economic disadvantage would be lawful but politically fraught. It would likely
be easier to address this issue at amacro level. One way to do this would be by ensuring
that geographic areas with more disadvantaged patients have sufficient ventilators and
medical staff. An alternative ‘reserve’ approach, which school districts have used to
allocate limited spots,31 would prioritize disadvantaged patients for a specified subset
of available resources. If based on geographic indicators of disadvantage, this approach
would be a ‘virtual’ version of macro-level allocation—rather than physically moving
27 A. Scalfari et al.,Mortality in Patients with Multiple Sclerosis, 81 Neurology 184, 184–92 (2013).
28 C.Hjorthøj et al.,Years of Potential Life Lost and Life Expectancy in Schizophrenia: A Systematic Review andMeta-
Analysis, 4 Lancet Psychiatry 295, 295–301 (2017).
29 A. M. W. Coppus, People with Intellectual Disability: What Do We Know About Adulthood and Life Expectancy?
18 Dev. Disabilities Research Rev. 6, 6–16 (2013).
30 See Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 735 (2007); id. at 795 (Kennedy,
J., concurring in part).
31 Parag A. Pathak et al., Leaving No Ethical Value Behind: Triage Protocol Design for Pandemic Rationing, Nat’l
Bureau Econ. Research, https://www.nber.org/papers/w26951.pdf (accessed Jun. 2020).
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ventilators to less advantaged areas, some ventilators at hospitals would be initially
reserved for patients from those areas.
We think that the difficulty of incorporating priority to the disadvantaged into triage
protocols presents a genuine dilemma. On the one hand, if hospitals take patients
with acute respiratory distress ‘as they find them,’ they risk preserving, if not exac-
erbating, background injustice. On the other hand, efforts to ameliorate background
injusticewithin triage protocols risk perpetuating other formsof injustice. Empowering
physicians and triage teams to consider which patients had in fact received fewer past
resources,32 or whose preexisting conditions stemmed from circumstances ‘beyond
their control,’33 would produce bias and arbitrariness, even before raising the broader
question of whether such determinations are appropriate bases for the distribution of
medical resources or social goods more generally.
Perhaps surprisingly, a ‘life-cycle’ principle that would give priority to younger
patients (who have lived through fewer life stages) might prove to be an administrable
and politically tenable way of ameliorating at least some disparities. Such a principle
has been endorsed in public engagement surveys, age is straightforward to assess, and
younger people in the USA aremore likely to be socioeconomically disadvantaged and
to be ethnic minorities.34
Should some individuals get higher priority because of their roles?
Some guidelines give health care workers higher priority for life-saving resources.
They are frequently ambiguous in their definition of health care workers and in their
justification for giving them priority. For instance, when recommending ‘priority to
those who are central to the public health response,’ one prominent guideline claims
that this category ‘should be broadly construed to include those individuals who play
a critical role in the chain of treating patients and maintaining societal order.’35 This
means that ‘it would not be appropriate to prioritize front-line physicians and not
prioritize other front-line clinicians (e.g. nurses and respiratory therapists) and other
key personnel (e.g. maintenance staff that disinfects hospital rooms).’36
It is helpful here to distinguish instrumental reasons for prioritizing health care
workers (eg saving more lives in the future) from non-instrumental reasons (eg reci-
procity for someone’s past sacrifice or contribution). Most who endorse saving more
lives—not only utilitarians—endorse policies like saving health workers that indi-
rectly savemore lives.37 Instrumental reasons, however, differentiate individuals whose
32 Cf.Hannah McLane, A Disturbing Medical Consensus is Growing: Here’s What It Could Mean for Black Patients
with Coronavirus, WHYY.org, https://whyy.org/articles/a-disturbing-medical-consensus-is-growing-heres-
what-it-could-mean-for-black-patients-with-coronavirus (accessed Apr. 10, 2020).
33 Harald Schmidt, The Way We Ration Ventilators is Biased, N.Y. Times, April 15, 2020, https://www.nytimes.
com/2020/04/15/opinion/covid-ventilator-rationing-blacks.html.
34 Katherine Schaeffer, The Most Common Age Among Whites in U.S. is 58—More Than Double That of Racial
and Ethnic Minorities, Pew Research Ctr., https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2019/07/30/most-
common-age-among-us-racial-ethnic-groups (accessed July 30, 2019); Kaiser Family Foundation, Poverty
Rate By Age, KFF.org, https://www.kff.org/other/state-indicator/poverty-rate-by-age/?currentTimefra
me=0&sortModel=%7B%22colId%22:%22Location%22,%22sort%22:%22asc%22%7D (accessed Apr. 17,
2020).
35 White, supra note 11.
36 Id.
37 See, e.g., Anderson, supra note 6; but see Kamm, supra note 6.
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valuable work would be taken over by others from individuals whose skills would be
difficult to replace. Doctors, nurses, and respiratory therapists all fall into the latter
category, but maintenance staff, despite the value of their contributions, fall into the
former category. No other category of workers could easily take over the work of doc-
tors, nurses, or respiratory therapists, whereas maintenance staff trained in disinfecting
other spaces, like schools or outpatient clinics, could move to hospitals. This might
seem unfair, but it is an implication of justifying priority on instrumental grounds.
Likewise, there is uncertainty about whether doctors, nurses, or respiratory therapists
who become severely ill will recover in time to benefit others. If the justification for
prioritizing them is saving more lives, then it will not apply if we know they will not be
instrumental to this goal.
A distinct and more problematic instrumental reason for prioritizing health care
workers is as an incentive to assume the risk of treatingCovid-19patients. To thosewho
believe that these workers should assume significant risk as part of their professional
duties,38 this incentive will seem unjust, as G. A. Cohen argues about principles that
incentivize the better off to do what morality requires.39
One non-instrumental reason for helping health workers is reciprocity: those who
risk their lives to help others deserve some priority in being helped. This rationale
could support prioritizing maintenance workers as well as clinicians. But unlike the
instrumental rationale of giving health care workers higher priority in order to save
more lives, adopting it could conflict with other relevant ethical principles, such as
maximizing benefits. For example, a patientwhohas contributed to saving othersmight
have a poor prognosis. Giving her priority because of her past work would assign her a
ventilator that would otherwise have gone to someone with a better prognosis or who
would be likelier to help others in the future.
Some commentators also object on grounds of principle to giving higher priority to
health care workers.40 They seem to think that there is a requirement of neutrality that
would prohibit preferential access based on one’s role. Whether a clear argument can
be developed to support this intuitive response remains to be seen.
Are patients’ existing lifesaving resources subject to redistribution?
A distinct and difficult issue is raised by the question of re-allocation. In end-of-
life decision-making, most bioethicists agree that with patient or surrogate consent,
there is no moral difference between withholding and withdrawing life support. That
consensus may break down in triage situations, where patients compete for scarce
lifesaving resources. Focus groups suggest that a significant minority of the public find
it ethically problematic to remove those resources from patients who still want them
and can benefit from them and reassign them to others who could benefitmore.41 This
38 For critical discussion, see generally Heidi Malm et al., Ethics, Pandemics, and the Duty to Treat, 8 Am. J.
Bioethics 4 (2008). Even for proponents of such a duty, it is debatable whether it extends to health care
professionals who lack adequate personal protective equipment—a situation frequently encountered in the
early weeks of the pandemic.
39 G. A. Cohen, Rescuing Justice and Equality (Harvard Univ. Press 2008).
40 Edmund D. Pellegrino, Altruism, Self-Interest, and Medical Ethics, 258 JAMA 1939, 1939–1940 (1987).
41 E. L. D. Biddison et al., Scarce Resource Allocation During Disasters: A Mixed-Method Community Engagement
Study, 153 Chest 187, 187–195 (2018).
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discomfort appears to be felt bymany whowould not object to initially assigning those
resources based on prospect of benefit.
We are ourselves divided as to whether this judgment is ultimately an ‘endowment
effect’ that gives excessive importance to themere possession of a resource.42 While an
endowment effect is one possible explanation, it is also possible that the distinction
between withholding and withdrawal could have genuine moral significance in one
context—here, competition for scarce resources—that it lacks in another.43
Things become more complicated when the resource being removed was given to
an individual before the onset of scarcity and has been used by that individual for an
extended time. Long-term users worry that their ventilators, which they require for life,
may be taken away from them to save patients requiring short-term ventilation. Some
guidelines, like those of theNewYork State Task Force, specifically exempt those users,
but the rationale for doing so is disputable. Ventilators are not literally parts of the user’s
body or physically incorporated into them, as pacemakers are; indeed, they are often
used intermittently and rented from a device company.
Most of those long-term ventilatorsmay not be useful for Covid-19 patients in acute
respiratory distress. But if theywere, wewould be forced to confront complex questions
about which rights individuals acquire in external devices that replace or supplement
vital organic bodily parts. A multiplicity of factors have intuitive appeal but debatable
relevance in answering these questions, including the length of time the individual has
used thedevice, the extent towhich it is physically attached toor functionally integrated
with their body, the expectations with which the individual received the device, the
‘legitimacy’ of those expectations, and the legal ownership of the device. We might
sidestep at least some of these questions by regarding those using long-term ventilators
as entitled to retain them simply because they are vulnerable and disadvantaged, and
should receive priority on that ground.44 This solution would again implicate the issue
of how to balance maximizing benefits against prioritizing the least advantaged.
CONCLUSION: IMPLICATIONS FORPRACTICE
Given the urgency of preparing for shortages of lifesaving resources during this pan-
demic, it would be irresponsible to end by merely recommending further study of
the more difficult issues we have identified. Instead, we conclude, on the basis of an
overlapping consensus onmany critical issues and recalcitrant disagreement on several
others, that there aremultiple reasonable approaches to rationing those resources. First-
come, first-served is not one of them, however; it will almost certainly have an adverse
impact on people who are already disadvantaged without treating patients more fairly
than policies that take some account of prognosis.
42 D. Hubbeling, Rationing Decisions and the Endowment Effect, 113 J. Royal Soc’yMed. 98, 98–100 (2020).
43 These concerns, however, may rarely arise in practice, since the most widely adopted guidelines, like the
Pittsburgh protocol, call for ventilator reallocation only if the patient is deteriorating despite it, which comes
close to a futility criterion. Moreover, it may be almost as difficult to estimate the length of time needed for
episode survival when an intubated patient is stable or improving as it is to estimate ventilator time before
intubation.
44 The New York State Task Force Report’s recommendations provide one example of the incorporation of a
categorical ban on the re-allocation of long-term or ‘private’ ventilators into a triage protocol. See New York
State Department of Health, Ventilator Allocation Guidelines, health.ny.gov, https://www.health.ny.gov/re
gulations/task_force/reports_publications/docs/ventilator_guidelines.pdf (accessed Nov. 2015).
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Any reasonable protocol should have several features: first, it should give primary
weight to the probability of surviving the current episode; second, it should estimate
that probability based on the most individualized assessment feasible, not on pre-
existing disease or disability; third, it should exclude any explicit or implicit judgment
of the patient’s prior quality of life; fourth, it should give priority to those who will
use less of the scarce resource over those who will use substantially more if there is
reliable, individualized evidence on which to make that determination; fifth, it should
favor younger over older patients, at least when other things are equal; sixth; it should
take some account of survival beyond the immediate episode, giving priority to those
expected to survive more than a few weeks or months.
A variety of different triage protocols could satisfy these conditions. Reasonable
schemes will differ in how much of a disparity in survival probability and resource use
they take account of; in the role they assign to age or life-cycle stage; in how they take
account of differences in survival time beyond the current episode; in how they take
account of background injustices that cause some groups to have worse prognoses or
greater needs than others; in the priority, if any, that they assign to health care workers;
and in whether they impose different standards for the initial allocation and the re-
allocation of ICU ventilators. These variations will reflect differences in the weights
assigned to the competing values of maximizing benefits and prioritizing the worst-off;
differing views on the acceptability of giving priority to health care workers; and the
painful but unavoidable imperfection of line drawing when lives are at stake.
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